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OT vs IT: Securing the Industrial World

Power plants, water works and factories run on operational technology, and protecting it takes more than a regular firewall.

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  1. Lo lus nug 1

    In OT security, which goal usually comes first?

    • Availability and safety of the process
    • Confidentiality of stored data
    • Anonymity of the plant operators
    • Speed of software updates
  2. Lo lus nug 2

    Why are PLCs in a plant often left unpatched for years?

    • Their vendors forbid any software changes
    • Patching needs downtime and retesting the process
    • They cannot be infected by any malware
    • Patches for them only exist on paper
  3. Lo lus nug 3

    Which malware, found in 2010, sabotaged Iranian uranium centrifuges?

    • WannaCry
    • NotPetya
    • Stuxnet
    • Mirai
  4. Lo lus nug 4

    What is a key security weakness of the classic Modbus protocol?

    • It only works over satellite links
    • It has no built-in authentication
    • It encrypts data with a broken cipher
    • It needs a cloud server to run
  5. Lo lus nug 5

    In the Purdue model, which level holds the physical sensors and actuators?

    • Level 3
    • Level 4
    • Level 0
    • Level 2
  6. Lo lus nug 6

    A plant claims its OT network is air-gapped. Which still threatens it?

    • A USB stick plugged in by a contractor
    • Phishing emails sent to the OT switches
    • Ransomware in the public cloud only
    • Weak passwords on the cafeteria Wi-Fi
  7. Lo lus nug 7

    Which standard series is built specifically for industrial automation security?

    • ISO/IEC 27001
    • IEC 62443
    • PCI DSS
    • ISO 9001
  8. Lo lus nug 8

    Why is aggressive active scanning risky on an OT network?

    • Old devices may crash from unexpected traffic
    • Scanners legally count as an attack there
    • OT devices hide behind invisible IP addresses
    • Scans permanently erase network switch logs
  9. Lo lus nug 9

    In 2015, attackers cut power to about 225,000 people in which country?

    • Estonia
    • Ukraine
    • Germany
    • Georgia
  10. Lo lus nug 10

    What device allows data to flow only one way out of an OT network?

    • A load balancer
    • A VPN concentrator
    • A data diode
    • A proxy server
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